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ARE TALEBEARERS REALLY AS BAD AS
TALEMAKERS?: RETHINKING
REPUBLISHER LIABILITY IN AN
INFORMATION AGE
Jennifer L. Del Medico*
INTRODUCTION
It was a spectacle that "produced without question some of the
most bizarre testimony," a district court judge commented in hind-
sight.' The 1982 Pulitzer divorce trial featured tales of sex, drugs,
and s6ances that were splashed throughout magazines and newspa-
pers across the country.2 Many of the scandalous details involved
Janice Nelson, the woman who served as Mrs. Pulitzer's marriage
counselor and psychic.3 Nelson testified on behalf of Mr. Pulitzer
because she felt that Mrs. Pulitzer should not have custody of the
couple's children.4
While the high-profile Pulitzer divorce produced juicy fodder for
news reports, the media's real gain from the case came five years
after the divorce trial when Nelson sued several media organiza-
tions for defamation. During the divorce trial, the Associated
Press erroneously reported that Nelson conducted s6ances in the
Pulitzer home where ten to fifteen people surrounded Roxanne
Pulitzer, who was in bed with a trumpet and a black cape.6 Both
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.S.J., Northwestern
University, 1999. Thanks to Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea and my former em-
ployer, The Star-Ledger, for inspiration. I would also like to thank James D. Hyre his
help in preparing this piece for publication. This Comment is the winner of the first
annual Fordham Urban Law Journal Alumni Association Student Author Award.
1. The statement of Judge J. Spellman, author of the opinion in Nelson v. Associ-
ated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Later in the opinion, Judge
Spellman writes that the Pulitzer trial "elicited some of the most preposterous testi-
mony imaginable during the 18 days it lasted." Id. at 1482.
2. Id. at 1471. Trial testimony was filled with stories of adultery, lesbian trysts,
incest, and drug use. Id. at 1473. Testimony indicated that Roxanne Pulitzer slept
with a Palm Beach real estate salesman, a French baker, a Belgian race-car driver, and
the wife of Kleenex heir James Kimberly. Paradise Lost, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 24.
3. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1471. Nelson, who operated an astrology business,
voluntarily left Palm Beach to avoid attention because of her association with Rox-
anne Pulitzer. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1471.
6. Id. at 1473-74.
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The Miami Herald 7 and The New York Post republished this erro-
neous dispatch.8 Knight-Ridder wire service sent out a similar
story over its news wire that The Washington Post republished.9
Newsweek reported the same story based on information from va-
rious newspaper and wire service reports. 10 After the publications
of these statements, the Associated Press issued a retraction which
stated that "[i]n a Pulitzer deposition made available Thursday,
[Mr. Pulitzer] describes sdances-unrelated to Ms. Nelson-that
Mrs. Pulitzer conducted in their home."'"
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the republish-
ers1 2 based on a "powerful, but often neglected libel defense"
called the "wire service defense. '"13 This defense allows the media
to republish news without liability for defamation if the informa-
tion passed over a news wire and the subsequent publisher did not
know or have reason to know that the material was defamatory.1
4
In certain circumstances, this privilege exempts the media from the
strict common law rule that imputes independent liability to third
parties who republish libelous statements. 15 Whether the defamed
individual is a public or private figure is not a factor in determining
whether the wire service defense is applicable.1 6 Therefore, the
7. Id. at 1478-79.
8. Id. at 1482-84.
9. Id. at 1481.
10. Id. at 1475-78.
11. Id. at 1473.
12. Id. The court granted summary judgment to the Associated Press because
Nelson failed to provide notice of the suit as required under Florida law. See infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Kyu Ho Youm, The "Wire Service" Libel Defense, 70 JOURNAL-
ISM Q. 682 (1993) (tracing the history and use of the wire service defense from its 1933
inception to the date of the article's publication).
14. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1474 (holding that the wire service defense is law in
Florida); see also infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
the wire service).
15. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1480; see generally, James E. Boasberg, With Malice
Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13
HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 455, 457-64 (1991) (tracing the history of the wire ser-
vice defense).
16. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964), the Court held
that in order for a public figure to recover for defamation, the publisher must have
acted with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that [the statement] was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." See also Harte-Hanks Com-
munications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). But see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri-
vate individual").
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media can potentially get the case dismissed on summary judgment
without engaging in litigation concerning whether the defamed is a
public or private figure.
Over time, spreading the news has become more of a coopera-
tive endeavor. In 1848, the Associated Press was founded as a
news cooperative for six New York papers." Today, the Associ-
ated Press serves 1700 newspapers and 5000 radio and television
stations around the country.' 8 More than thirty other news wires,
from institutions like United Press International to the two-year-
old Women's Enews, relay news to media outlets around the coun-
try.19 Journalists frequently rely on these services for facts or
quotes to incorporate into original stories and publications often
use entire wire service stories as a replacement for self-generated
copy.20
The very existence-and recent proliferation and expansion-of
the wire service privilege illustrates that traditional republication
liability does not allow news organizations to function effectively in
a society that demands rapid news dissemination.21 Today, twenty-
one jurisdictions currently recognize the seventy-year-old defense,
the majority of them electing to do so within the last twenty
years.2 2 In the past decade, eight jurisdictions have approved the
wire service privilege.23
17. OLIVER GRAMLING, AP: THE STORY OF NEWS 19-27 (1940) (telling the story
of the founding of the Associated Press); see also Associated Press, Facts & Figures, at
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
18. See Associated Press, supra note 17.
19. Am. Journalism Review, News/Wire Services (2003), at
http://ajr.org/News-WireServices.asp?MediaType=9 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (list-
ing current wire service).
20. See Howe v. Detroit Free Press, 555 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996). "Such a defense is consistent with the custom and practice of the newspaper
industry, in which reliance on the accuracy of wire-service articles is commonplace."
Id. at 741.
21. See infra notes 84-116 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the
wire service defense).
22. See Youm, supra note 13, at 688 (citing thirteen jurisdictions that rely on the
wire service defense as of 1993).
23. They include Arizona (Med. Labor Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 931
F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996)); California (Peper v. Gannett Co., No.
2002061753, 2003 WL 22457121, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2003)); Illinois (Kapeta-
novic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prod., 97-C2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27,
2002)); Michigan (Howe, 555 N.W.2d at 738)); Minnesota (Cole v. Star Tribune, 581
N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)); Texas (Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman,
923 F. Supp. 924, 927 (W.D. Tex. 1996)); and Virginia (Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938
F. Supp. 39, 44 (D.D.C. 1996) (federal court applying Virginia law)). Some of these
jurisdictions have applied the defense when the medium relied on was a television
network. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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The acceptance of the defense suggests that the strict common
law rule burdening republishers with potential liability should be
abolished if there is no showing of actual knowledge that the mate-
rial was defamatory. Thus, the "actual malice" standard articulated
in New York Times v. Sullivan, which applies to public figures,
should apply to all individuals in cases involving republishers.24
The Sullivan Court defined acting with "actual malice" as publish-
ing material "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not."25 This Comment argues that
the standard established by Sullivan is the proper standard to im-
pose on republishers who publish material noting that it originates
from another source, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public
or private figure.
Whether republishers can escape liability for defamation should
not turn on the technology involved. In its traditional form, the
defense is only applicable when a wire service is involved in the
news distribution.26 Without the wire service privilege, a news or-
ganization can face liability for defamation if it reports verbatim
what has appeared in another publication, even if the item is attrib-
uted.27 It is time to re-evaluate the old adage in libel law that
"[t]alebearers are as bad as talemakers. 21
Part I of this comment chronicles the history and expansion of
the wire service defense since it first appeared in a 1933 decision.29
Additionally, Part I posits that the early development of the wire
service defense was likely a tool to protect technological develop-
ments that improved news distribution over the wire.30 Part I also
discusses the reverse wire service defense, which developed more
than sixty years after the first articulation of the defense.31
Part II will examine New York's broader approach to evaluating
whether a republisher should be held liable, which displaces the
24. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
25. Id. at 280.
26. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933) (holding that papers that
act as a "local screen" and reprint news dispatches from wire service are protected
from libel claims via the wire service defense).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578(b) (1977).
28. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915) (holding that a newspaper can be held liable for defamation when it reported
with attribution that another newspaper published a story accusing the local police
chief of illegally putting his son on the city payroll).
29. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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need for a privilege like the wire service defense.32 Under New
York law, in matters involving public figures and matters of public
concern involving private figures, republishers must act in a grossly
irresponsible manner in order to be held liable. 33 Under this stan-
dard, the court must determine whether the initial publisher was a
reliable source and whether the republisher acted as would a pru-
dent journalist.34
Finally, Part III concludes that the common law rule holding re-
publishers liable for defamation should be replaced with a pre-
sumption in favor of republication.35 This presumption would
allow republication of news without liability when a republisher
meets certain criteria, regardless of the type of medium involved,
unless the republisher acted with actual malice.36 This Part also
points out problems with both the traditional wire service defense
and New York's broader approach.37 Part III also discusses how
Congress has limited traditional republication liability for Internet
service providers, which illustrates that republisher liability is un-
suitable in modern times. 38 This change supports the important
goal of ensuring that speech is not chilled, a core First Amendment
value, and that news is not kept from the public.39 In addition, this
Part will suggest that the traditional rule barring the original pub-
lisher from being held liable for third party publication of the origi-
nal publisher's statements should be altered to account for truly
harmed plaintiffs.40
32. See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
36. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). The qualified privilege is granted to republishers in New York who have no
reason to question the accuracy of the article or the good faith of the reporter. An-
other factor to be considered when evaluating the republisher's behavior is whether
the republisher followed "sound journalistic practices" in republishing the material
and whether it adhered to "normal procedures, including editorial review of the
copy." Id.
37. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market .... ).
40. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WIRE SERVICE DEFENSE
Part I examines Layne v. Tribune Co., the first case to articulate
the wire service defense, and the policy reasons for departing from
the strict common law rule that republishers are liable for defama-
tion regardless of whether they attributed the source of the mate-
rial.41 This Part also hypothesizes that the court's holding was
partly in response to changing technology that made wire services
more efficient.42 In addition, this Part discusses how courts have
expanded the defense, applying it to news organizations that go
beyond acting like Layne's "local screen. ' 43 For an understanding
of why the media would benefit from the defense, it is necessary to
examine the elements of defamation and republisher liability. 4
A. The Elements of Defamation
The elements of the defamation tort vary from case to case de-
pending on several factors: the identities of the parties, the charac-
ter of the alleged defamatory statement, and the law of the
jurisdiction applied to the action.4 5 The general elements are, how-
ever: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting
to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication. '46
The wire service privilege is a powerful tool for the media in
battling some defamation lawsuits because of the continued exis-
tence of the rule that secondary publishers are subject to the same
liability as the original publisher.47 The common law of libel has
long held that a publisher adopts the defamatory comment as its
own through republication. 48 This rule, which aims to protect repu-
41. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-53.
45. ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 63 (2nd ed.
1994).
46. Id. at 63-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977)).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); see also Short v. News-Jour-
nal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 719 (Del. 1965). In Short, the court stated in dictum that the
traditional republisher liability applied and "neither good faith nor honest mistake
constitutes a defense, serving only to mitigate damages." Id. at 719.
48. SACK, supra note 45, at 361 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,
838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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tations,49 excludes those who are involved solely in the delivery or
transmission of the defamatory material, such as a telegraph com-
pany putting through a call.5 0 Thus, absent a privilege, a newspa-
per is subject to liability if it republishes a defamatory statement,
"although it names the author and another newspaper in which the
statement first appeared."51 Under the wire service privilege, how-
ever, the media defendant has the potential to prevail at the early
summary judgment phase,52 thereby destroying the plaintiff's cause
of action.53
B. A Privilege for Republishers: Layne v. Tribune Co.
Layne v. Tribune Co. 54 first articulated the "wire service de-
fense" and its rationale, although the terminology was not coined
until years later.55 Layne, a Congressman's secretary, sued The
49. See, e.g., Times Publ'g Co. v. Carlisle Journal Co., 94 F. 762, 766 (8th Cir.
1899).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977).
51. Id. at § 578, comment b; see also Times Publ'g Co., 94 F. at 767 ("[Ilt is no
justification for the publication of such a libel that another had spoken or written the
false charge, and that the libeler simply repeated his statement, and that he gave the
name of his informant.").
52. The wire service defense does not apply differently to public or private figures,
making it a tool that allows media defendants to get an early motion for summary
judgment since the private/public question, which is often heavily litigated, is not an
issue. See Youm, supra note 13, at 688 (reminding media defendants not to overlook
a summary judgment motion based on the wire service defense if appropriate).
53. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1484-85 (S.D. Fla.
1987). Nelson could not sue the original publisher, the Associated Press, because she
did not give proper notice under Florida statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 770.01 (West 1986)
required plaintiffs in a civil action brought against the media for libel or slander to
notify the defendant specifying the article and the statements that are allegedly de-
famatory. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1473. Nelson notified the Associated Press that she
was filing a defamation suit, but failed to point to the specific defamatory statements
in specific press dispatches. Id. The court said that Nelson had that information avail-
able, since she sued two other newspapers the following day that reproduced copies of
the offending Associated Press story. Id. The Florida statute requires the best notice
possible. Id. at 1474. In addition, the wire service defense barred Nelson from recov-
ering from Newsweek, The Miami Herald, and The New York Post. Id. at 1484-85.
The court noted that this outcome is "ironic" and recognized that "[t]here is no ques-
tion but that Plaintiff feels victimized by the nature of these proceedings and this
result." Id. at 1485. "The irony does not 'smack' of injustice in the federal courts ....
The First Amendment, unfortunately [sic] as it may be, does not otherwise protect
Plaintiff's subjective feelings." Id. "Regardless, the court is adamant that First
Amendment protection justifies-and demands-this result." Id. The decision "must
be understood as a price we pay for upholding a Bill of Rights which believes that the
truth is best arrived at from 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' comment." Id.
54. 146 So. 234, 237-38 (Fla. 1933).
55. Id. at 238. But see Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62, 63 (10th Cir. 1933)
(affirming a jury award for a woman libeled by an article stating that she was jailed on
2004] 1415
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Tampa Morning Tribune after the paper published two wire stories
that said he was indicted for possession of alcohol.56 The court
held that when a newspaper republishes a wire story from a "gen-
erally recognized reliable source of daily news," there is no cause
of action for defamation unless there is evidence that the publisher
"acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in reproducing
it."' 57 The court likened the republisher to a "local 'screen"' lack-
ing authorship.5 s Later courts ruled that republishers do not have
to use the wire service byline, nor are they confined to acting as a
local screen, to be afforded the privilege. 9
While the Layne court recognized that the wire service defense
was at odds with the majority common law view of republisher lia-
bility,60 the court justified its decision by relying on policy reasons
and the ancient common law "to the effect that one who hears a
slander has a legal right to repeat it," in the same words and with
attribution.61 It appears, however, that the Layne court errone-
ously interpreted the ancient common law.62 The court extended
forgery charges; the court rejected defendant's defense that they should not be liable
because they based their article on an Associated Press dispatch).
56. Layne, 146 So. at 235-36. Both stories had a Washington dateline. Id.
57. Id. at 238.
58. Id. at 239.
59. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(stating that a newspaper does not lose the wire service defense if the article in ques-
tion does not explicitly carry the wire service byline). In addition, headlines the re-
publisher created that are based on the wire story are only actionable if information is
added or subtracted, which would make the headline itself libelous. MacGregor v.
Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
60. Layne, 146 So. at 237 (approving of the modern rule that in cases of libel and
slander, one who republishes the statement "must be held liable for the publication of
a libel or defamatory words in regard to another, even though he is but repeating
what he has heard, and names his authority, and although the repetition is made with-
out any design to extend circulation..." (citing World Publ'g Co. v. Mullen, 61 N.W.
108, 109 (Neb. 1894)), because one "who repeats a slander or libel is presumed by his
reiteration of it, to indorse it and make it his own" (citing Evans v. Smith, 21 Ky. 363,
363 (1827))).
61. Id. at 237-39 (citing Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. 442 (Ala. 1836); Johnson v. St.
Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539 (1877)). Johnson suggested, without holding, that one
who repeated a slander was not liable for slander for repeating the statement if he
said it in the same words and attributed the source. 65 Mo. at 541 ("That one heard
another make the charge which he repeats, will not screen him unless at the time of
repeating the words, he affords the plaintiff a cause of action against the original
author."); see also Nelson, 667 F. Supp at 1476 (discussing the ancient common law
and allowing slander to be repeated without liability, and concluding that "modern
newspapers could not exist without a similar privilege").
62. What Layne refers to as the ancient common law rule allowing one to repeat a
slander without liability if the source was attributed is actually inaccurate; the origin
of this inaccuracy is dicta in the Earl of Northampton case, 12 Coke. Rep. 132 (1613).
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this erroneous rationale to news organizations, recognizing that
"[t]he modern daily newspaper is an institution of news dissemina-
tion that was unknown to the early common law," and that judicial
notice allowed the court to adjust common law principles to better
serve society.63
The Layne court reasoned that adopting a wire service defense
would give papers access to news from around the country and the
world that would be of interest to their readers.64 Without such a
privilege, a newspaper would be forced to verify every news item it
published, while "at the same time keep up the prompt daily ser-
vice expected of present day newspapers. ' 65 Later courts recogniz-
ing the defense explained that an obligation of independent
verification "would leave only large, wealthy newspapers capable
of covering multiple stories and regions. 6
6
Since Layne, courts have added several requirements which a
news organization must fulfill to raise the defense:67 the repub-
lisher must read the release to make sure there are no inconsisten-
cies; 68 the article must not be republished if there are unexplained
inconsistencies or if the news organization republishing the article
knows the article is false; 69 and if a reasonable jury could disagree
as to whether something in the article should put the newspaper on
notice of a possible inaccuracy, the defense is not available and
summary judgment is not appropriate.70
See JOHN TOWNSHEND, TOWNSHEND ON SLANDER AND LIBEL 300-03 (4th ed. 1890)
(discussing the impetus for the erroneous belief that a repetition could be justified by
declaring the name of the previous publisher).
63. Layne, 146 So. at 238. Courts are not "wholly powerless to remold and reap-
ply the ancient rules so as to fit them to modern conditions, where there has arisen
and become involved, new factors of life and business arising from the complexities of
a mechanized era of human progress." Id. at 237.
64. See Layne, 146 So. at 237.
65. Id. at 239; see also Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1480 ("The wire service defense is
fully consistent with the First Amendment-an amendment which tolerates occa-
sional, non-negligent mistakes for the sake of getting out the news people want.").
66. Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing
the wire service defense in Minnesota and granting summary judgment for papers that
relied on a story from The Associated Press "because there is no question that the AP
is a reputable news service that provides accurate information").
67. See Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 738, 740-42 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996).
68. Id. at 740-41.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 742. The decisions, however, lack guidance on what type of information
that would be so outrageous as to put the defendant republisher on notice that the
story was potentially defamatory. Examples of information that would not put the
republisher on notice can be found in Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp.
1468, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1987) and in O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp.
141720041
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While using the term wire service defense for consistency, some
modern courts have recognized that the defense is actually a defini-
tion of the duty a newspaper has when republishing information
from a wire service.71 Requiring verification of facts, these courts
reason, would impose a standard of extraordinary care, not ordi-
nary care, on the media.72 These courts focus their analysis on the
standard of care, not on whether the medium involved can some-
how be classified as or identified with a wire service. Whether the
information came from a wire can be an element used to evaluate
whether a republisher demonstrated ordinary care.
C. Defending the Media, Protecting Technology
Significantly, the Layne court's decision recognizing the wire ser-
vice defense appeared shortly after technological advances made
news dispatches via the wire quicker and more efficient.73 The in-
vention and widespread use of the teletype system changed news-
gathering. 4 Prior to the teletype system, the telegraph system
transmitted news in the form of dots and dashes, which had to be
converted into words. 75 Telegraph technology improved margin-
ally since its invention in 1844, and the human element plagued the
218, 225 (E.D. Ky. 1990). The Nelson court said that while the statement "drugs were
used and sex was had" is false and arguably defamatory, it was not enough to put The
New York Post on notice. Nelson, 661 F. Supp. at 1482. "This is because, admittedly,
the Pulitzer trial elicited some of the most preposterous testimony imaginable during
the eighteen days it lasted." Id. In O'Brien, the court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the paper should have been on notice as to the defamatory nature of the
statements because the article contained accusations that teachers were involved in
sexual misconduct. 735 F. Supp. at 225.
Allegations of wrongdoing are published nearly every day and involve peo-
ple world-wide. The plaintiff has offered no authority which holds that the
mention of sexual misconduct should automatically require an independent
investigation by every newspaper which wishes to publish such a story as
transmitted via the AP. The burden would clearly be onerous ....
Id.
71. See Howe, 555 N.W.2d at 740-41; see also O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 218, 220
(stating that "the so-called 'defense' is actually a definition of ordinary care in regard
to the use of wire service stories").
72. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 537 (S.D. Ga.
1988). Here, the federal district court, sitting in diversity, decided that the Georgia
Supreme Court would have applied the wire service defense, pointing to the logic
behind the defense and the fact that neighboring states had adopted it. Id.
73. Five years before the Layne court approved the wire service defense, the As-
sociated Press replaced the telegraph with the teletype printer. See Libby Quaid,
Morse Was The Source: Telegraph Served AP for Eight Decades, at http://www.ap.org/
anniversary/welcome4.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
74. Id.
75. See RICHARD SCHWARZLOSE, THE AMERICAN WIRE SERVICES 80-81 (1979).
1418
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system's efficiency.76 Although the more efficient teletype system
was introduced in 1914,'7 it was not until the mid-1930's, around
the time of the Layne decision, that this new technology was in
widespread use for news transmission. 8
The teletype took the human element out of wire service trans-
mission, thereby increasing its efficiency.79 Transmitting news via
the wire service was "ingressed deeply into the social fabric" 80 by
the development of the teletype. Even prior to the advanced tech-
nology, the news wires were already an accepted part of society.,,
Increased efficiency and widespread use turned the work of the
wire service into a social institution, whose international stories
American newspaper readers came to expect.82 It follows that
courts would want to protect a valuable social institution like the
wire services and promote their use and growth. In fact, a contrary
decision in Layne could have potentially destroyed the wire service
industry. Papers fearing traditional republisher liability may have
forgone the use of wire news. While it is unknown if papers would
have reacted this way, this potential scenario was exactly what the
Layne court sought to avoid.83 This rationale, however, does not
76. Id. Although the system could transmit thirty-five words-per-minute, the
words were transmitted as dots and dashes which needed to be translated by opera-
tors. Id. Errors in translation were frequent. In addition, wire service telegraphers,
following the lead of Western Union telegraphers, unionized. Id. During the first
fifteen years of the century, the wire service telegraphers fought with management,
sometimes striking, in order to secure privileges similar to other telegraphers. Id.
This movement impacted transmission efficiency. Id.
77. Id. (stating that the early models of the teletype were not reliable). The tele-
type "was simply a consolidation of a typewriter mechanism (in both sending and
receiving stations) with a device for transmitting electrical impulses along connecting
telegraph or telephone wires (or even through the atmosphere by radio)." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. "The innovation raised transmission rates to sixty words per minute, re-
duced operator manpower to a single sender for each trunk or regional wire, and
permitted reception of a greater volume of cleaner, more uniform, and more immedi-
ately usable news copy in the newspaper office." Id.
80. Id. at 88.
81. See generally MENAHEM BLONDHEiM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES: THE TELE-
GRAPH AND THE FLOW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN AMERICA, 1844-1897, at 6 (1994)
("For by the early 1850's at least two columns of Associated Press news appeared
daily in nearly every major American newspaper.").
82. See SCHWARZLOSE, supra note 75, at 202-05, 339 (arguing that the wire ser-
vices attained "the position of a social institution in the United States"). "In fact, this
status increasingly appears also to accrue to them abroad by virtue of their increasing
ingression into the communication processes of foreign societies." Id. at 203.
83. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933) ("To hold otherwise
would mean that newspapers at their peril published purported items of news, against
the falsity of which no ordinary human foresight could effectually guard and at the
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explain why the defense became popular in recent years, with
courts opting to apply the defense more liberally.
D. Broadening the Scope of the Defense
The Layne court provided the justification for the wire service
defense, but left many questions open for subsequent courts, in-
cluding when the defense should apply and what the relevant stan-
dard of care should be. Courts since Layne have continued to
recognize that the defense facilitates the quick dissemination of
news,84 but many courts have rejected applying the defense only to
breaking news. While the Layne court referred to the republish-
ing newspaper as a "local" media outlet, the court did not define
the term "local." 86 Later courts expanded the notion of the repub-
lisher to include national media organizations.87 In addition, sub-
sequent courts have further clarified the threshold the media has to
meet in order to invoke the defense.' 8
Courts since Layne have been clear that the application of the
wire service defense does not turn on whether the republished re-
port is breaking news," or if the republisher theoretically could
have covered the story on its own without hardship.90 Almost fifty
years after Layne, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Appleby v.
Daily Hampshire Gazette9' ruled that the wire service defense ap-
plied even when the news reported was breaking and did not take
place in a remote location.92 In Appleby, a convicted felon sued
various newspapers in ninety-four actions, claiming that they de-
famed him in reporting information related to a criminal investiga-
tion of which he was the subject.93 Thirty-three of the papers filed
same time keep up the prompt daily service expected of present day newspapers.");
see also Nelson v. Associated Press, 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
84. See generally Ripps v. Gannett Co., CV 91-B-1954-S, 1993 WL 209617 (N.D.
Ala. Mar. 3, 1993). "The [wire service defense] recognizes the importance of publica-
tion before news becomes stale." Id. at n.4.
85. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
86. 146 So. at 234.
87. See, e.g., Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1471.
88. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Ky.
1990).
89. Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 726 (Mass. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 723.
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for summary judgment were based on the wire service defense. 94
The Appleby court ruled in favor of summary judgment using the
same rationales as the Layne court, even though the papers in Ap-
pleby were Massachusetts-based and were published not far from
Appleby's Massachusetts home, the setting of the stories.95 The
Appelby court reasoned that making a distinction between local
stories and remote stories "would impose the same risks of 'appre-
hensive self-censorship,' as would the requirement that newspapers
corroborate all wire service stories before publication. ' 96 In addi-
tion, the court rejected the "local screen" rationale from Layne and
extended the defense to include stories that were not republished
verbatim, but which instead accurately restated the substance of
the wire service stories. 97
While the Layne court did not expressly limit the defense to
newspapers, it did not specifically authorize its application to other
news sources. Subsequent courts, however, have extended the de-
fense to television networks98 and magazines. 99 One court even
suggested that the defense could be extended to radio broad-
casts.100 The Nelson court allowed Newsweek, a national news-
94. Id. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of four papers that
were representative of the others and delayed ruling on the rest to save time and
money until appeals were exhausted in the four test cases. Id.
95. Id. at 726. The four papers were The Medford Daily Mercury, The Boston
Globe, The Daily Hampshire Gazette, and The Holyoke Transcript-Telegram. The
Medford Daily Mercury republished stories verbatim from the United Press Interna-
tional, while the rest of the papers republished stories verbatim from The Associated
Press. Id. at 723.
96. Id. at 726 (quoting Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161,
169 (Mass. 1975)).
97. Id. (stating that there is no difference between reprinting verbatim and accu-
rately restating a wire story's contents).
98. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Ariz. 1996) (the wire service defense applies to a network affiliate that acted as a
mere conduit for ABC's Prime Time Live); see also Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell
Prods., Inc., No. 97-C2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (stating,
without concluding, that the wire service defense may extend to nonaffiliated net-
works); Bryks v. Canadian Broad. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 927 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (noting
that "the wire service defense and the liability of broadcaster defense are correlative
enough to be used interchangeably"); Peper v. Gannett Co., No. 061753, 2003 WL
22457121, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2003) (holding that CNN's reliance on a repu-
table wire service story allowed them to successfully use the wire service defense).
99. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(holding that the wire service applies to Newsweek magazine).
100. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 n.2 (S.D. Ga.
1988) (stating that the court suspected that the radio station defendant would be
granted summary judgment based on the defense should he decide to submit a motion
to the Court).
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weekly, to successfully assert the defense because periodicals
"obviously must rely for their sources of information upon other
reliable periodicals, newspapers and wire service reports." 10 1 The
court further justified the extension, adding that "[t]hese periodi-
cals are an integral part of today's news information services." 1°2 It
should be noted, however, that there is still a question as to
whether Layne should be extended to other media. While some
courts have applied the wire service defense to other mediums,
none have discussed whether there are limits as to what type of
medium the defense could be extended to cover. Some courts have
taken the reasoning of the wire service defense and applied it to
protect the wire service when it disseminates member-created
work, rather than that of the wire service reporters.10 3
E. Protecting the Wire: The Reverse Wire Service Defense
The same reasoning behind protecting republishers who rely on
news wires has been used to protect "reputable news services" like
The Associated Press under a "reverse wire service defense."' 04 A
reverse wire service defense allows a wire service to escape liability
for defamation if the story it distributed was the work of a reputa-
ble news source instead of the wire service's own reporter. 0 5 In
this situation, the wire service would not have the duty to indepen-
dently verify the facts of the story, and could raise the defense as
long as it did not know or have reason to know that the material
was defamatory.0 6
Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Reilly v. Associ-
ated Press,' upheld summary judgment in favor of The Associated
Press, holding that the wire service had no independent duty to
verify the facts of a story before disseminating it when the story
came from a reputable source and had nothing on its face to indi-
cate that it was defamatory.' In Reilly, the wire service distrib-
uted an allegedly defamatory story from The Boston Herald about
101. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1477.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
104. Reilly v. Associated Press, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003);
see Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 322 (Haw. 1983); see also Winn v.
United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (D.D.C. 1996); Winn v. Associated Press,
903 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
105. Reilly, 797 N.E.2d at 1217.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1217-18.
108. Id. at 1218. But see Mehau, 658 P.2d at 322 (holding that defendant UPI could
not rely on the reverse wire service defense when picking up a story from a new
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a veterinarian under disciplinary investigation for negligent prac-
tice and the paper disseminated a condensed version of the story to
Associated Press members. 10 9 The court ruled that the reasoning
behind the wire service defense applied to the situation here pro-
vided that the elements needed to raise the privilege were met. 110
The Reilly court recognized that newspapers and wire services
have a "symbiotic" relationship and must be able to trust each
other to disseminate news effectively. 1 ' While one of the ratio-
nales underlying Layne v. Tribune Co. was to allow smaller, re-
source-poor publications to publish news outside their
communities without the fear of liability,112 the court in Reilly de-
cided that the ability to disseminate the news, rather than the re-
sources available to a particular news organization, justifies the
reverse defense. 13 It would be difficult to rely solely on Layne's
justifications to defend applying the defense to large, well-funded
news cooperatives like The Associated Press." 4
In addition, the Reilly court, like many courts examining the
standard wire service defense, refused to draw a distinction that
would allow the defense to be raised in regard to "fast-breaking"
national and international news, but not "local, human interest or
news features, arguably concerning 'lesser' events. 1" 5 The court
justified this rejection, saying that it would be an "impermissible
burden" on the media and the courts to identify these "subtle dis-
tinctions.""' 6 Further, like media asserting the traditional privilege,
"tabloid without a 'track record' for reliability" that was known to sensationalize the
news).
109. Reilly, 797 N.E.2d at 1209. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of
The Boston Herald, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Reilly negligently treated the animal in question. Id. at 1218.
110. See id. at 1217 (quoting Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721,
725 (Mass. 1985)).
111. See id.
112. 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933); see also Mehau, 658 P.2d at 323 (pointing out that
should the court not apply the wire service defense, the paper "may be reduced to an
organ reporting news of Hilo and the Big Island").
113. 797 N.E.2d at 1217 (concluding that "[w]hile the AP's resources may be
greater than a small local newspaper's, it cannot afford to verify every news item
originating from every one of its member publications and still disseminate news
promptly"); see also Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (holding that Newsweek was entitled to a wire service defense regardless of
the fact that it was a large, national, weekly publication.)
114. The Associated Press has 242 bureaus and a budgeted revenue of more than
$500 million. See Associated Press, Facts & Figures, at http://www.ap.org/pages/
aptoday/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
115. 797 N.E.2d at 1217.
116. Id.
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wire services looking for protection under a reverse wire service
defense must show that they relied on a trustworthy source.
F. Determining Who Is a Reliable Source
Papers can raise the wire service defense even if they did not rely
on a wire service itself, but instead relied on other local papers that
republished wire copy.117 In McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc.,118
the defendant newspaper editor relied on information from at least
five area newspapers when writing a story. 119 The papers upon
which the editor relied were state papers that were arguably local
papers since none of them had a national circulation, and some did
not even circulate throughout the state.12 0 In McKinney, however,
the court found that "[t]he sources relied upon ... are known for
their accuracy and are regularly relied upon by local newspapers
without independent verification." 1 21 Thus, smaller papers have
the privilege of relying upon their larger counterparts.
Arguably, the court in McKinney created a hierarchy that de-
fined "local" in relation to the size of the party that wrote the origi-
nal story and the party that relied upon it. For example, the North
Carolina Press Association classifies the Avery Journal as a com-
munity newspaper, while the papers it relied upon are all classified
as daily newspapers. 22 Although the court did not mention this
distinction, it seems that the local requirement articulated in Layne
is not uniform, but instead is evaluated based on how the repub-
lishing paper relates in size and scope to the medium upon which it
relied.
Expanding the definition of a reliable source is also illustrated in
Gay v. Williams,23 where the Alaska district court applied the
principles of the wire service defense without explicitly mentioning
117. See McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
Arguably, media organizations that raise the defense do not have to be subscribers of
the news wire. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The papers included The Charlotte Observer, The Winston-Salem Journal,
The Asheville Citizen, The Greensboro Daily News, and The News and Observer. Id.
The Charlotte Observer article was a reprinted Associated Press story. Id.
120. See N. Carolina Press Ass'n, NCPA Member Newspapers, at http://www.nc
press.com/membersbytown.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
121. McKinney, 393 S.E.2d at 297.
122. See N. Carolina Press Ass'n, supra note 120.
123. 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979). While the Alaska court did not invoke the
wire service defense by name, it ruled that neither the wire service nor the local news-
paper could be held liable for reasonably relying on IRE's published report. Id. at 16-
17.
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it by name. 124 There, the court granted summary judgment based
on the logic of the wire service defense in favor of a local newspa-
per that relied upon an Associated Press story.125 The court also
dismissed the Associated Press from the action because its story
was a summary of a report from Investigative Reporters and Edi-
tors, Inc. ("IRE"). 26 The IRE story reported allegations that Gay
was involved with drug smuggling.1 27 The Associated Press re-
porter assigned to write stories about the IRE reports chose not to
feature the story written about Gay.128 At the request of one of the
Alaska member papers, however, the Associated Press wrote and
disseminated a story that included the allegations against Gay. 29
The court granted summary judgment in favor of The Associated
Press, despite the plaintiff's claim that IRE was not a reputable
news source on which the wire should reasonably rely.1 30 IRE was
only formed two years before the articles in question were pub-
lished, which suggests that longevity is not a major factor in deter-
124. Id.
125. Id. The court accepted the newspaper's argument that if they did not have the
ability to rely on The Associated Press as a reliable source of news, then they would
only be able to publish local news. Id.
126. Id. at 13. According to IRE's website, the group, founded two years before
the stories in Gay were written, is a grassroots nonprofit organization dedicated to
improving the quality of investigative reporting. See IRE, History of IRE, at http://
www.ire.org/history (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). The AP did not conduct its own inves-
tigation about the facts in the IRE stories. Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 17.
127. Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 13. Journalists from around the country participated in
IRE's Arizona Project to investigate organized crime in Arizona after the death of
Don Bolles, an investigative reporter for the Arizona Republic, who was killed by a
bomb in 1976 on his way to meet an informant. Id. "The stories stated that 'pub-
lished accounts of a series by a team of investigative reporters' say that Gay, 'a
wealthy Alaskan bush pilot and owner of a small Arizona boarder town,' was a 'mys-
tery man of the Arizona drug corridor,' and that the town owned by Gay is a 'major
crossing point for drug smugglers."' Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id. The Ketchikan Daily News and Southeast Alaska Empire both published
the Associated Press story in question. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 17. The court said that the fact that many newspapers around the coun-
try refused to cover the IRE stories, especially the one about Gay, did not mean that
the stories were unreliable. Id. The court also said that Gay failed to show that The
AP should have questioned the IRE's reliability. Id. In addition, the court dismissed
stories from The Chicago Tribune and The Los Angeles Times that were critical of
IRE's methods, reasoning that the stories were published after the Gay story was
published, and that they did not pertain to The Associated Press's "knowledge at the
time of publication." Id.
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mining reliability.131 Other courts, however, have suggested that
longevity is indeed a factor in evaluating reliability. 3 2
G. Limits to the Wire Service Defense
In addition to the nature of the source relied upon, other factors
limit the applicability of the wire service defense. While it is not
necessary for republished text to mirror the wire service text verba-
tim, 13 3 adding further substantial material may bar the defense.134
In O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 35 the wire service defense
protected all but one of the newspaper defendants that republished
an Associated Press story about a school meeting. Parents of high
school students called the meeting in response to the expulsion of a
student who fought with a teacher.136 The media organizations re-
ported that during the meeting, parents also requested that the ad-
ministration investigate allegations of teachers having affairs with
students. 37 The Associated Press story reported that while none of
the speakers linked the fight between the expelled student and the
teacher to the allegations of sexual misconduct, "most [of the par-
ents] referred to 'allegations' and 'charges' surrounding the [fight]
that could prove harmful to a teacher's career."'' 38 The teacher in-
volved in the fight sued for defamation because of the implication
that the reason the male student attacked him was because he was
having an affair with a female student. 39
The O'Brien court ruled that the wire service defense was not
applicable to the Williamson Daily News because the reporter ad-
ded a paragraph at the end of The Associated Press report that
raised a negligence issue.14 The lesson from cases subsequent to
O'Brien is that strict adherence to the factual essence of the wire
131. See IRE, supra note 126.
132. See Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 317 (Haw. 1983) (referring to
one of the media defendants as a tabloid without a "track record" for reliability).
133. See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Mass. 1985).
134. See O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 224 (E.D. Ky. 1990).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 221-22, 225.
137. Id. at 221-22.
138. Id. at 224.
139. Id. at 225.
140. Id. at 224. The additional paragraph stated, "[Phelps High School principal]
O'Brien said last week that if 'something was going on, I want to stop it.'... O'Brien
confirmed that he had received a complaint against [the teacher involved in the fight]
from a 17-year-old female who is a senior at the school, but that she was not accompa-
nied by a parent." Id. (alteration in orginal).
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service story is necessary to benefit from the defense's liability
shield.14'
In addition, to successfully assert the defense, journalists must be
able to point to the exact article upon which they relied.1 42 The
Jewell court stated that the wire service defense was not applicable
to reporters who, in their affidavits, said they relied on wire service
and televised reports but who could not point to the precise reports
that they used.143 The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the reason the reporters could not identify the precise wire report
was because more than a year had passed between the time they
relied on the reports and when their affidavits were taken. 144 The
result of this candid admission was a denial of a summary judgment
motion based on New York's broader republication privilege.145
The court reasoned that since the defendants could not point pre-
cisely to the articles upon which they relied, they could not estab-
141. Medure v. Vindicator Printing Co. provides an example of when the defense
cannot be used because there is a material issue of fact as to whether or not the
reporter "substantially altered the words in materials that preceded her article .... "
273 F. Supp. 2d 588, 618 (W.D. Pa. 2002). The magistrate who initially handled the
case noted that there was no showing that the wire service defense was available in
Pennsylvania. Id. The second magistrate, however, arguably recognized the defense
here because, although the court noted that the defendants have cited no authority
that shows the wire service defense is available in Pennsylvania, the court goes on to
apply the defense to the facts and concludes that it is not applicable here. Id. at 618-
19. In the end, the court ruled in favor of the defendants based on grounds other than
the wire service defense. Id. at 619. Here, the reporter was writing about alleged
improprieties in the Indian casino industry. She reported in November 1997 that
Gaming World, the company that ran the Indian casinos, was under an FBI investiga-
tion and allegedly stole $22 million from the casino. See id. at 589. The 1996 Associ-
ated Press story she allegedly relied on, however, quoted a legal advisor to the tribe
saying that the FBI expected to begin an investigation in early September 1996. See
id. at 618-19. Also, there was more than a year between that Associated Press state-
ment and the allegedly defamatory Vindicator article. See id. Should the court find
that there is a material fact as to whether the words of wire service story were altered,
summary judgment based on the wire service defense is not appropriate. See id.
142. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 371-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Jewell, a former Olympic security guard, sued several media defendants after they
linked him in stories to the July 27, 1996 bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in
Atlanta during the centennial Olympics. Id. at 356. Here, the court comments that
"curiously," the New York courts have never cited Layne v. Tribune, nor have they
discussed the wire service defense. Id. at 370. Instead, New York law regarding re-
publication is even broader than the wire service defense, recognizing "a general re-
publication defense applicable to anyone who republishes material from any source,
provided that there was no substantial reason to question the accuracy of the material
or the reputation of the reporter." Id. at 371. But, the judge went on to discuss the
wire service defense in this opinion. Id. at 370-74.
143. Id. at 371-74.
144. See id. at 372.
145. See id.
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lish that they did not have substantial reason to question the
accuracy of the Associated Press reports. 146
I. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO REPUBLISHER LIABILITY
This Part discusses New York's qualified privilege for republish-
ers as an alternative to the wire service defense.147 While the New
York privilege is similar in many ways to the wire service defense,
the New York privilege substantially broadens the shield for repub-
lishers.148 This approach is broader because its protection is not
limited to media organizations; instead, it also allows non-tradi-
tional media entities like public relations companies to successfully
invoke the privilege when they rely on clients as reliable sources
when preparing press releases. 49
A. New York's Approach to Republisher Liability
New York offers a qualified privilege to all republishers, regard-
less of whether a wire service is involved. Republisher liability in
New York does not hinge on whether or not news passes over a
wire. 5° Instead, in cases involving private figures and matters of
public concern,1 51 New York plaintiffs must show that the repub-
lisher acted "in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consid-
eration for the standards of information gathering and
dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.' 1 52 This
qualified privilege is granted to republishers in New York who
have no reason to question the accuracy of the article or the good
faith of the reporter. 153 When evaluating the republisher's behav-
ior, New York courts also consider whether the publication fol-
146. See id.
147. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
148. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
149. See id.
150. See Zetes v. Richman, 447 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (App. Div. 1982); see also
Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
151. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), defined the ac-
tual malice standard when dealing with public figures. To act with actual malice
means one must have knowledge that a story is false or act with reckless disregard as
to whether it was false or not. Id.
152. Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (noting that while the grossly negligent
standard was initially used for media defendants, it has been applied to non-media
defendants); see also Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569,
571-72 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that getting information from two authoritative sources
and having two editors check the reporter's work did not illustrate grossly negligent
behavior).
153. See Zetes, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 779; see also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that a book publisher could rely on
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lowed "sound journalistic practices" in republishing the material,
and whether it adhered to "'normal procedures,' including edito-
rial review of the copy. 154
Zetes v. Richman was the first New York case to apply this quali-
fied privilege to a situation involving republication from a wire ser-
vice story.'55 There, the defendant, Tonawanda Publishing Corp.,
appealed from a denial of summary judgment. Tonawanda claimed
it could not be held liable for defamation for republishing a United
Press International story reporting that the plaintiff was selling de-
fective souvenir pennies commemorating the 1980 Winter Olym-
pics in Lake Placid.1 56 The court granted summary judgment in
Tonawanda's favor because the plaintiff failed to show that Tona-
wanda had reason to question either the accuracy of United Press
International, or the "bona fides" of the sports editor who wrote
the story.157 Zetes did not mention the possibility of the wire ser-
vice defense, even though courts in other jurisdictions had already
adopted the defense.158 The strict common law standard of repub-
lisher liability is only valid in cases where the elements of New
York's qualified privilege are not met.
B. The Privilege Is Not Limited to Traditional
Media Organizations
Over time, New York's qualified privilege to republish devel-
oped into a more inclusive privilege than the wire service defense.
In Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., the plaintiff, the owner of an
online designer retail site, www.offtherunway.com, sued Cyveil-
lance, the magazine Inter@ctive, and PR Newswire after it included
her business in a story about websites that sell counterfeit designer
goods.161 The article was based on a press release that defendant
PR Newswire transmitted to Inter@ctive 161 from Cyveillance, a
the work of a reporter based on the reporter's credentials and there having been no
reason to question the accuracy of the stories).
154. See Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (quoting Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp.,
119 F.3d 1018, 1031 (2d Cir. 1997)).
155. See 447 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting
that the defense had never before been mentioned in a New York opinion). The
defense, however, had been recognized sixty-five years earlier in Florida. See Layne
v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933).
159. 145 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
160. Id.
161. Ziff Davis, Inc., who was named in the lawsuit, owned Inter@ctive. Id.
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company that conducts investigations of internet sites that sell
counterfeit goods or real products sold without the permission of
the designer. 162 The court granted summary judgment for PR
Newswire, reasoning that the plaintiff could not establish that PR
Newswire was grossly irresponsible. 163 The court held that PR
Newswire could reasonably rely on information that its client,
Cyveillance, provided. 164 PR Newswire knew the nature of Cyveil-
lance's business, and the press release that it received was related
to that subject.' 65 In addition, "the source of the [press release]
had previously provided accurate information and there were no
facts which should have aroused the suspicions of Newswire or that
would give cause for further inquiry."'16 6 While Cyveillance was
not a traditional media outlet, PR Newswire still had the privilege
to rely on the company's information.
In Tzougrakis, the court erred on the side of calling a source
reputable until it proved otherwise, establishing a presumption of
reliability. PR Newswire had only received two other press re-
leases from Cyveillance prior to the one in question. 167 Appar-
ently, a minimum showing-two prior press releases that did not
prompt any allegations of libel-was enough for a republisher to
consider a source reliable. 68 This standard allows republishers
much more protection than the wire service defense, where repub-
lishers can only rely on publications with a substantial track record
establishing credibility.
The Cyveillance court also granted summary judgment in favor
of Inter@ctive because the plaintiff could not prove that the maga-
zine acted grossly irresponsible.169 The reasoning here was based
heavily on the credentials and actions of the reporter involved. 70
162. Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
163. Id. at 332. Defendant PR Newswire claimed that it could not be held liable for
republication because it was more like a distributor, such as a telegraph company or a
printer, which would require a showing of actual knowledge of the statement's defam-
atory nature in order for PR Newswire to be liable. Id. But, the court pointed out
that PR Newswire had editorial control over the press release and formatted it before
distribution, which would make them more than a distributor. Id. The court did not
rule on whether PR Newswire was a distributor or a publisher because neither would
affect the outcome with regard to PR Newswire. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 328.
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The court noted that the reporter had fifteen years experience 171
and that she conducted "an adequate investigation of the facts re-
ceived" 17 2 in the press release.
If New York adopted the strict interpretation of the wire service
defense instead of its broader republisher qualified privilege, it is
likely that neither Inter@ctive nor PR Newswire would have been
able to take advantage of the defense. The issue would be whether
the original publishers qualified as a traditional, reputable source
of daily news. Arguably, a company sending out press releases or
its client would fail to meet that standard because their primary
goal is to sell a product, not disseminate news.
The elements of the wire service defense and New York's quali-
fied privilege for republication are similar, except for the former's
requirement that the information relied upon come from a wire or
similar source of daily news. But, even that requirement of the
wire service defense has been relaxed over the years. Many cases
illustrate that the trend is to make the wire service defense more
inclusive, with courts applying it to magazines, television sta-
tions,"' and possibly radio.'74 This suggests that there may not be
any justification for restricting the privilege to republish to certain
types of media. All of these modifications imply that the tradi-
tional justifications should be replaced in favor of a rule that allows
republication without liability for libel in the absence of actual
malice. 175
171. Id.
172. Id. at 332.
Although [the reporter] did not actually speak with offtherunway.com, the
site had no direct contact information posted. [The reporter] also was una-
ble to discover any contact information after performing a sufficiently dili-
gent search. It is undisputed that [the reporter] attempted to use the email
link provided by offtherunway.com but that the link did not work. Further-
more, absent obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the article, Ziff-Davis
was entitled to rely on . . . a trusted reporter's representations without
rechecking her assertions or retracing her sources.
Id.
173. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cas., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Ariz. 1996) (explaining that the wire service defense applies to a network affiliate
that acted as a mere conduit for ABC's Prime Time Live); see also Bryks v. Canadian
Broad. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
174. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D. Ga.
1988). In footnote 2, the court "suspects" that the radio station defendant would be
granted summary judgment based on the defense should he decide to submit a motion
to the Court. Id. at 538 n.2.
175. See infra notes 178-232.
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Il. REWORKING REPUBLISHER LIABILITY FOR LIBEL
Before arguing that libel law should immunize republication in
the absence of actual malice, Part III examines problems which
make both the traditional wire service defense 176 and New York's
approach inadequate.1 77 This Part concludes that while the New
York qualified privilege starts to address the shortcomings of the
wire service defense, the New York approach does not go far
enough. Part III also discusses how Congress has limited tradi-
tional republication liability for Internet service providers, which
illustrates that republisher liability is unsuitable in modern times.
178
This Part then argues that there should be a presumption against
holding republishers liable, which can be overcome only if the
plaintiff shows actual malice. First, Part III.A discusses and dis-
misses a general critique of the negative impact republication could
have on the marketplace of ideas.1
79
A. General Critique of Immunizing Republication
Critics may argue that allowing media organizations to rely on
each other could have the effect of stifling the marketplace of
ideas.1 80 The court in United States v. Associated Press pointed out
just how important the marketplace of ideas is to First Amendment
jurisprudence.181 There, the court noted that the newspaper indus-
try "serves one of the most vital of all general interests: The dis-
semination of news from as many different facets and colors as is
possible."' 8 z If a media outlet knows that it will be shielded from
liability if it acts as a mere conduit of news, there is less of an in-
centive to find the facts on its own and construct its own story.
Theoretically, one less voice on a subject creates less of a chance
that the truth is reported. 18 3
The stronger argument, however, is that rather than adversely
affecting the market place of ideas, changing the traditional repub-
176. See infra notes 191-208.
177. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
180. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-52 (Hackett Publ'g ed., 1978) (1859).
Mill argued that citizens must be free to espouse false speech in order for the truth to
be discovered. Id.
181. 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the
bylaws of The Associated Press violated anti-trust laws).
182. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
183. See MILL, supra note 180.
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lication rule will actually increase the flow of news. 184 First, it
strains credulity to believe that a substantial number of journalists
will forego opportunities to report and write stories on their own
and instead rely increasingly on another published report.
185
Scooping the competition is often what personally drives journal-
ists to produce their own stories.'86 In addition, pressure from edi-
tors to beat the competition, or at least produce the same quality
story as the competition, makes it highly unlikely that the quality
of journalism would suffer should the republication rule be re-
pealed. 87 Using attributed work would likely only happen when
resources impede a media organization's attempt to report its own
story.
In addition, seventy-five percent of entry-level daily newspaper
journalists in the 1990s graduated from a college program in media
or mass communications, 88 despite the fact that, unlike doctors or
lawyers, there is no professional degree required to become a jour-
nalist.'8 9 The high rate of journalists educated specifically in com-
munications severely undermines an argument that many
journalists would rely on published work rather than reporting a
story on their own. Students of journalism who have paid
thousands of dollars for their degrees1 90 and are serious about en-
tering the profession are unlikely to envision themselves as
stenographers.
B. Problems with the Wire Service Defense
Media ownership, like the degree of journalists' education, has
changed tremendously in recent years. Thus, a limited republica-
tion defense like the wire service privilege makes less sense in to-
day's society as compared with the time when the common law
184. See generally David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The
Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1207 (1995).
185. See DAVID H. WEAVER & G. CLEVELAND WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN JOUR-
NALIST IN THE 1990S: U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AT THE END OF AN ERA 217-29 (1996) (dis-
cussing factors that journalists interviewed identified as being part of their best work).
186. Id. at 225 (quoting a journalist who indicated that breaking news was a factor
for evaluating a journalist's best work).
187. See generally DAVID J. KRAJICEK, SCOOPED! (1988). Krajicek recounts the
pressure of having to chase a story after it appeared in a rival New York City newspa-
per. Id. at 1-5.
188. See WEAVER & WILHOIT, supra note 185, at 32-33.
189. Id. The number of journalism departments and schools has doubled from 200
in 1972 to 413 in 1992. Id. at 30-31.
190. See June Kronholz, College Costs Play on Stump: Candidates Offer Promises
to Needy Students, But No Solutions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2004 at A4. In 2004, the
average cost for tuition and room and board at a public university was $10,636. Id.
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republication rule was first articulated.191 The number of family
newspapers has severely declined, as they have been absorbed into
media conglomerates. 192 For example, in 2002 Gannett Corp.
owned ninety-four daily community newspapers around the coun-
try with a paid circulation of 7.6 million.193 Gannett also owns a
wire service that allows its papers around the country to share
news.194 Many other media conglomerates also own a wire ser-
vice.195 Therefore, small newspapers do not enjoy the same benefit
of the wire service defense.
A major problem with the wire service defense in this context is
that, in terms of defamation liability, it treats the reporting of me-
dia conglomerates as a single publication, giving them a benefit
similar to the single publication rule. The single publication rule
states that "[any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one
radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or sim-
ilar aggregate communication is a single publication," and a pub-
lisher can only be held liable once.'9 6 Thus, a media defendant
could not be sued twice for defamation if a statement appeared in
its morning and afternoon editions. 197 In situations where the re-
publishing newspaper is part of a large chain with a wire service,
191. James V. Risser, State of the American Newspaper: Endangered Species, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., June 1998, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3276.
Shortly after World War II, three-fourths of all newspapers were independently
owned. Id. In the late 1990's about 300 out of 1504 dailies in the United States were
independent, most of them small. Id. Only fifteen independents have circulations
exceeding 100,000. Id. Twenty-five have 50,000 to 100,000 subscribers. Id. More
than half have fewer than 10,000. Id.
192. See Rob Dean, The Tenacity to Take on a Corporate Giant, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, July 11, 1999, at S-69. As of April 1999, 269 newspapers out of 1477 na-
tionwide were independent. Id. In 1997-98, thirty family-owned newspapers were
sold to chains, according to information compiled by Dirks, Van Essen & Associates,
a Santa Fe-based company that arranges the sale of newspaper companies and tracks
ownership trends. Id.
193. Gannett Co., 2002 Annual Report (2003), available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media-files/IROL/84/84662/reports/2002ar.pdf. Gannett recorded $6.4 billion
in operating revenue in 2002. Id.
194. Id.
195. For example, Advance owns thirty-one papers and two wire services, The
Newhouse News Service and The Religion News Service; Dow Jones owns twenty-five
papers and The Dow Jones News Service; Knight-Ridder owns fifty-five papers, Trib-
une Co. owns fifteen, and together the two companies own KRT Direct; Cox News
owns seventeen newspapers and The Cox News Service; and The New York Times
Co. owns The N.Y. Times News Service, which has forty-four newspaper sources. Co-
lumbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What?, at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (1977).
197. Id. at comment 3.
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the work of a single entity in the company is treated similarly to a
single publication across the company when the wire service de-
fense is applied. Smaller media companies and family-owned oper-
ations that lack a wire service do not receive a similar benefit.
There is no reason to believe that news that passes over a wire is
more reliable and more worthy of dissemination and protection
than news that is republished without going out over a wire.
Courts, however, have ignored this changing landscape and have
often relied on seventy-year-old justifications of the defense."' 8
In addition, courts have not hinted at why the wire service, as a
conduit of news, warrants protection. Their decisions give little
guidance on this point, only stating that it is important to allow the
free dissemination of news so local media are not forced to report
only on the events in their geographical area.1 99 None of the wire
service decisions discuss why news transmitted over the wire de-
serves preferential treatment with regard to republisher liability.
While protectionism may have been an impetus for creating the
wire service defense, 0 0 it does not answer the question of why
more modern courts continue to apply it. Interestingly, the major-
ity of states that recognize the defense first did so in the past
twenty years,20' when the wire services were already an established
social institution that arguably no longer needed protection.20 2 The
proliferation of the defense illustrates the importance that the abil-
ity to republish information has in our society.
There is no justification for limiting republisher liability to in-
stances where the original material passes through a news wire.
While the imagery of the wire lends itself well to analogizing re-
publishers to mere conduits20 3 of information, the wire is not the
only credible way to relay news without taking ownership of its
creation. Instead of limiting republisher liability with the wire ser-
198. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 323 (Haw. 1983).
200. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
201. Fourteen jurisdictions recognized the defense in the past twenty years. See
supra at note 23 for jurisdictions and cases since 1996. The following jurisdictions
recognized the wire service defense from 1983-1996: Georgia (Brown v. Courier Her-
ald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D. Ga. 1988)); Hawaii (Mehau, 658 P.2d at
323); Kentucky (O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Ky.
1990)); Massachusetts (Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 726
(Mass. 1985)); North Carolina (McKinney v. Avery Journal, 393 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1990)); and Wisconsin (Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Pub-
lisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
202. See supra note 82.
203. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 931 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Ariz. 1996).
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vice defense, courts should eliminate the old common law liability
for republication. The power of a privilege like the wire service
defense is no match for the traditional republication rule when it
comes to chilling speech.2 4 Although media defendants over-
whelmingly win defamation lawsuits, the threat of litigation often
significantly impacts publication decisions, thereby chilling
speech.205
In addition, the recent move of courts to recognize the reverse
wire service defense illustrates the expansion of limited liability.
This, absolves republishers from liability for republishing material
that first appeared in a newspaper, as long as that material passed
through the wire.20 6 If the reverse defense were not created, the
traditional common law standard of liability would apply. Courts
justify the reverse wire service defense saying, "[tihe responsibility
for accurate, nondefamatory reporting lies with the newspaper that
published the original story, not the wire service that 'demon-
strated ordinary care in preparing and transmitting the article.'
20 7
A showing of ordinary care should also absolve from liability any
publication that takes material from another publication and re-
publishes it with attribution. 8
C. Why the New York Approach Is Not the Right Answer
While the New York privilege is broader in scope than the ap-
proach taken by jurisdictions using the wire service defense, New
York's qualified privilege also fails to go far enough. First, the
privilege effectively allows courts to create a hierarchy of what
types of publications are reliable sources.20 9 While the court in
Tzougrakis was quite liberal in deciding what constituted a reliable
204. See generally Boies, supra note 184, at 1297 (discussing the great impact of
possible litigation on the media's publication decisions, and concluding that the chil-
ling effect is "significant"). "[Litigation] is also expensive for the defamation defen-
dant, and that discourages some in the media from undertaking stories (or
undertaking approaches to stories) they know may engender litigation, whether they
believe they can actually win that litigation." Id. Boise argues that to counter the
chilling effect, courts should consider applying the English fee-shifting rule to defama-
tion cases. Id. at 1212.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
207. Reilly v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (quot-
ing Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
208. Winn, 903 F. Supp. at 579. "[T]he wire service defense is available where, as
here, a news organization reproduces an apparently accurate article by a reputable
publisher, without substantial change and without actual knowledge of its falsity." Id.
209. Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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source,210 there is uncertainty as to how other judges would define
the concept of reliability.
This Comment argues that it is irrelevant whether or not the
court believes the initial publisher was reliable. The real question
is whether or not the republisher published the work with the ac-
tual malice-knowledge that there were factual errors or acting
with reckless disregard of the truth of falsity of the facts alleged.
Instead of looking to courts to determine which publications are
reliable, media organizations should make this determination for
themselves. If a media organization is going to republish with attri-
bution something appearing in another publication, they are subtly
aligning their credibility with that of the other publication. There-
fore, should the initial publisher be an unreliable source, it is un-
likely that the republisher will rely on that source since the
republisher will not want to tarnish its own reputation. The focus
must be on the behavior of the republisher.
Another problematic issue in regard to the New York approach
is the court's inquiry into whether or not sound journalistic prac-
tices were followed. 211 There are no objective criteria that help a
court make that determination. It is true that courts routinely
make similar determinations with the help of expert witnesses. It is
troublesome, however, to have courts involved in fashioning
proper journalistic standards when one of the main functions of
journalists are to keep the branches of government, including the
judiciary, accountable for their actions.212
D. Congressional Action Illustrates that Republisher Liability Is
Incompatible with Society's Information Needs
Congressional action with respect to republishers on the Internet
illustrates the fact that neither the wire service defense nor New
York's "grossly negligent" standard is adequate. 3 While courts
had ruled that Internet service providers had First Amendment
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Constitution protects press so it can "bare the secrets of
government and inform the people").
213. The legislature apparently did not feel that the courts were doing enough to
protect Internet speech. After Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), the legislature overruled the decision by passing the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004). The act says that "[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." The
act states that
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protection, 14 they had also found that these publishers were sub-
ject to the traditional rules of republisher liability when they exhib-
ited editorial control.215 In response to cases like Stratton
it is the policy of the United States: (1) to promote the continued develop-
ment of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other inter-
active media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, un-
fettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received
by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online mate-
rial; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to de-
ter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of
computer.
Id.
214. In Stern v. Delphi Internet Services, 26 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1995), radio personality
Howard Stern sued the electronic bulletin board owner after it advertised its service,
which included a bulletin board to discuss Stern's candidacy for governor, using
Stern's picture. Delphi had been in business for eleven years and had more than
100,000 subscribers. The computer network offered three types of information: hard
information, such as news and stock quotes, computer games, and interactive features
like bulletin boards and e-mail. Id. at 696. Here, the court was faced with the novel
issue of whether an Internet service provider should be given First Amendment pro-
tection and be afforded the incidental use exception. Id. at 697. The incidental use
exception was established in Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing, 189 App.
Div. 467, 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). Stern, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 697. In Humiston, the
court "held that a news disseminator was entitled to display the name and photograph
of a woman who was the subject of the defendant's newsreel for the purposes of
attracting and selling the film." Id. at 697-98 (quoting Humiston, 189 App. Div. at
476). "Affording protection to on-line computer services when they are engaged in
traditional news dissemination, such as in this case, is the desirable and required re-
sult." Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698; see also Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (analogizing plaintiff's role as an online bulletin board
host to that of a news distributor, not publisher). The court held that Delphi was an
online distributor comparable to a news vender, bookstore or library, thereby al-
lowing it to benefit from First Amendment protection. Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
When faced with new technology the courts applied traditional defamation principles
to both the wire service and the Internet in order to allow the free flow of news and
avoid a chilling effect. Id.; see also Nelson v. Associated Press, 667 F. Supp. 1468,
1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
215. In Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, the court held that Prodigy was liable for defam-
atory messages posted on its bulletin board because the service held itself out as a
family-oriented online service that edited content. In addition, Prodigy sometimes
edited inappropriate content, and substantially changed posted messages. Id. at *6.
The court stated that it agreed with holdings in Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 144, and Auvil
v. CBS, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that a television affiliate is
not liable for defamation if the program came from the network because it is consis-
tent with the general rule that there is no "conduit liability" in the absence of fault).
What distinguished Prodigy from these cases is "Prodigy's own policies, technology
and staffing decision which have altered the scenario and mandated the finding that it
is a publisher." Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
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Oakmont v. Prodigy,16 Congress passed the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996, giving Internet service providers virtual immu-
nity from republication liability 17 regardless of the credibility of
their source .2 1 History has shown that when traditional republica-
tion rules threaten the expansion of technology with a potential for
increasing news dissemination, either progressive judges219 or Con-
gress will become involved. 20
E. Talebearers Should Not be Treated as Talemakers
This Comment argues that the proliferation of the wire service
defense and Congressional action to protect Internet republishers
demonstrates that the traditional rule holding republishers liable
for defamation should be replaced with a new approach. Under
this new approach, republishers would be entitled to republish ma-
terial so long as they did not act with actual malice, knowing the
material was defamatory, or acting with a reckless disregard for the
truth.22' In addition, the republisher could not materially change
the meaning of the information,222 and must identify the source of
the material, so there is no question of the material's origin. The
reliability of the origin, however, must not be a factor when evalu-
ating whether a republisher acted impermissibly.223 One of the jus-
tifications for imposing republisher liability was that the repetition
216. 1995 WL 823710.
217. It is not surprising that Congress got involved with protecting the Internet
since the U.S. government had funded the Internet's development beginning in the
early 1970s. See Robert E. Kahn, The Role of Government in the Evolution of the
Internet, REVOLUTION IN THE US INFORMATION INFRASTRUCrURE (1994), available
at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/newpath. The same kind of government
backing, however, was not present when Samuel Morse invented the telegraph in the
early 1800s.
Before the press took an interest in telegraphic technology, Morse exper-
ienced immense difficulty in diffusing the invention. Only after years of lec-
turing, lobbying, and negotiating was a bill to appropriate funds for an
experimental telegraph line brought before Congress, in 1843. In the course
of debate, the bill was encumbered by a proposed rider, appropriating funds
for experiments in mesmerism. This was perhaps less surprising than the fact
that the legislators were discriminating enough to vote down the rider and
uphold the original bill.
BLONDHEIM, supra note 81, at 32.
218. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
American Online, as a service provider under the Communications Decency Act,
could not be liable for providing a gossip report to AOL subscribers).
219. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933).
220. See supra note 213.
221. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
222. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
223. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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lends credibility to statement, and confirms it if there is no state-
ment of disbelief.224 This is simply untrue. This comment argues
that it is paternalistic and unrealistic to conclude that people are
not intelligent enough to digest information and for themselves de-
cide if it is worthy of belief. If American Online can republish the
Drudge Report under the Communications Decency Act without
liability,225 there is no good reason why USA Today should be
barred from republishing with attribution material from a tabloid,
should USA Today deem that information newsworthy.
F. Heightening Initial Publishers' Potential Liability
Should a presumption immunizing republication exist, there still
must be a chance for a worthy plaintiff to recover for damages to
his reputation. Thus, the original publisher is rightly held liable for
actual damages for third party publication. The traditional rule is
that original publishers are not liable for republication, either as a
separate cause of action or to enhance damages, unless the subse-
quent publication was a natural and probable consequence.226 The
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the original
publication, not the subsequent publication. 27 This rule would re-
quire adaptation to allow plaintiffs to fully recover for their dam-
ages should republisher liability be abolished in the absence of
actual malice.
A bright-line rule that third parties are privileged to republish
would put original publishers on notice that they may be held liable
for more than just their own publication. This would give injured
plaintiffs the opportunity to fully recover for their actual damages.
It is likely that the heightened liability potential will induce original
publishers to carefully source their stories before publication.
224. See MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 351 (2nd ed. 1898).
225. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that Ameri-
can Online, as a service provider under the Communications Decency Act, could not
be liable for providing a gossip report to AOL subscribers). "Section 230 [of the
Communications Decency Act] was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the me-
dium to a minimum." Id. at 50 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31
(4th Cir. 1997)).
226. See Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill. App. 570, 577 (App. Ct. 1882) (holding that
the original newspaper publisher was not liable for publication in subsequent
newspapers).
227. See Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F. Supp. 955, 960 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[Sltatute of
limitations runs from the date on which a publication was first made available to the
general public.").
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It is unlikely that saddling the original publisher with increased
potential for liability will chill speech. In the case of private indi-
viduals, 228 it will often be difficult to prove actual damage to repu-
tation outside of the plaintiff's community.2 29 Further, it is likely
that the original publisher will be a publication based in the same
community. The original publisher, however, is not likely to be lia-
ble for papers outside of the community because the defamed
plaintiff will not have suffered actual damage to his reputation as a
result of an out-of-town publication of the offending story. In the
rare case that it does actually harm the plaintiff, the injured party
will have recourse for all damages suffered from the original
publisher.
CONCLUSION
While the wire service defense is an important tool to protect
republishers from defamation suits, it does not go far enough to
serve society's need for news.2 30 Third parties should be free to
republish material so long as they specifically state their source, do
not deviate from the facts of the original source, and do not act
with actual malice.231 The courts and the legislature have already
taken steps that have weakened republisher liability.232 Courts
across the country have affirmed the use of the wire service de-
233fense, and Congress has passed the Communication Decency
Act of 1996, which virtually immunizes Internet service providers
from republisher liability. 234
The next logical step is to extend this privilege to all publica-
tions, rather than limiting it only to wire services and Internet ser-
vice providers. Thus, a presumption in favor of republication
would be created that could be defeated by a showing of actual
malice. Under this proposed approach, the prevailing plaintiffs
228. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that public
figures must prove actual malice to recover for libel). Because public figures already
have the high burden of proving the original publisher acted with actual malice, it is
therefore unlikely that they could successfully sue republishers unless a republisher
knew or should have known that the original material was libelous. See id.
229. See generally ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS,
RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES (1978) (stating that "chances are slim" that a local police
chief would sue an out-of-town paper for libel rather than a local publication). Id. at
312.
230. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 54-72, 84-132, 147-75, and 213-20 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 54-132 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
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would be able to hold the original publisher liable for subsequent
publications if the plaintiff could prove damages resulting from the
third party publication. In a technologically advanced society that
demands current news instantly, this approach best balances a
plaintiff's right to recover for defamation with the media's ability
to inform the public.
